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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEMS WITH INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
In June 1993, Joyce and Robert Gracie of Santa Maria, California, received
the best possible results from their trip to Russia: a little girl named Elena.'
After six miscarriages, the couple feared they would never be able to provide
their biological child, Erin, with a brother or sister.' Adoption agencies in the
United States offered them little hope.' Due to their age and the fact that they
already had a daughter, most agencies placed them further down the list in
priority for a Caucasian child.' So the Gracies turned to international adoption
and found three-year-old Elena, orphaned after her mother died from
complications from Elena's premature birth. After approximately eighteen
months and $11,000 in expenditures, Elena became a part of the Gracie family
on June 19, 1993. Coming up with the money for the adoption was a
challenge for the family, but the family agrees that Elena has been well worth
the wait and the price.'
Joyce and Robert, and thousands of other couples, have success stories
about their involvement in international adoption that they can share. The joy
and happiness that adoption brings to many families is clear in the numerous
achievements touted by adoption agencies across the country and the mothers
and fathers that willingly advocate the process to others considering adoption.7
The process of international adoption, however, is not without its failures and
disappointments; nor is it without persons attempting to take advantage of
would-be parents. On the one hand, critics claim that the current international
adoption process is too slow and that the variety of adoption laws among the
fifty states "[delay] and [interfere] with the future benefit to both parties. The
' Nicole Jacobs, Desire for Adoption Leads Pair to Russia, SANTA MARIA TIMES, July 6,
1993, at bttp://www.adoptioninternationalprogram.com/stroies/gracie.htrn.
2 Id.
3Id.
4 Id.
' Id. (including spending $3,500 on adoption agency negotiation, $2,500 on a home
evaluation, $5,000 on plane tickets, and other various expenses for physical examinations of the
family members and paperwork).
6 Id.
' Laura A. Cecere, A Statement by Laura A. Cecere, Director of China Seas, in Response
to Congressional Testimony on the Implementing Legislation for the Hague Convention on
Intercountry Adoption (HR 2909, S 682) (Feb. 7, 2000), at http://www.chinaseasadopt.org/
statement.html.
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law purports to protect the interest of children but instead has become a barrier
to many children waiting for homes in the United States."'
On the other hand, prospective parents continue to choose international
adoption instead of the domestic alternative for a number of reasons.
International adoptions often cost less, birth mothers are less likely to reclaim
the children, adoptive families that meet the requirements of the child's home
country are guaranteed a child, and the wait for a child will be an average of
six months to two years compared to up to ten years in the United States.9
Advocates also claim that the inclusion of the state "readoption" step once the
couple returns to the United States with the child provides further assurance
that the adoption is final.'0
The purpose of this Note is to highlight the problems with the current
international adoption system and to understand why past attempts to reform
it have failed." Current reform is necessary to curtail baby-selling, coercion
8 Lisa K. Gold, Comment, Who's Afraid of Big Government? The Federalization of
Intercountry Adoption: It's Not as Scary as it Sounds, 34 TULSA L.J. 109, 111 (1998).
9 Jonathan G. Stein, Note, A Call to End Baby Selling: Why the Hague Convention on
Intercountry Adoption Should be Modified to Include the Consent Provisions of the Uniform
Adoption Act, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 39, 63-64 (2001) (describing how couples who desire
to adopt a Caucasian baby may wait up to ten years).
10 See, e.g., Laura A. Nicholson, Note, Adoption Medicine and the Internationally Adopted
Child, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 473, 479 n.63 (2002).
" See Peter P. Pfund, Intercountry Adoption: The 1993 Hague Convention: Its Purpose,
Implementation, and Promise, 28 FAM. L.Q. 53, 70-73 (1994). The United Nations (UN) has
attempted to address baby-selling, coercion ofbirth mothers, and oppressive adoption processing
fees. The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery entered into force on April 30, 1957. UN Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, http://www.unhchr.
ch/html/menu3/b/30.htm (last visited June 26, 2005). Article I(d) requires state parties to take
all necessary measures to abolish trade in children. See Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept.
7, 1956, art. 1 (d), 266 U.N.T.S. 40,41. The Supplementary Convention failed to eliminate baby-
selling because the enforcement provisions were weak and no provisions were added to allow
the UN to monitor the problem or provide effective solutions. See Stephanie Farrior, Note, The
International Law on Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution: Making It Live Up
to Its Potential, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 213, 222 (1997).
A second document, the UN Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the
Protection and Welfare of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption
Nationally and Internationally, was adopted by the General Assembly in 1986 to promote
domestic adoptions in hopes that this would decrease the abuse of international baby-selling.
See generally Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare
of Children with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and
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of birth mothers, and oppressive adoption processing fees, which challenge the
UN's mission to expand human rights to all peoples and discourage the
treatment of human beings as commodities. 2 In addition, it will analyze the
strengths and weaknesses of the newest reforms, the Convention on Protection
of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague
Convention), 3 and the legislation the U.S. Congress has passed to implement
that treaty, the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 (IAA)."4 An evaluation of
Internationally, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 95th plen. mtg., arts. 13-24, U.N. Doe. AIRES/41/85
(1986). Unfortunately, as a UN declaration the document is not legally binding. Cf. IAN
BROWNuE, PRINCIPLESOFPUBLIC INTERNATIONALLAW 14-15 (6th ed. 2003). Additionally, the
document offered no penalties for those in violation of the principles set forth in the declaration.
See Holly C. Kennard, Note, Curtailing the Sale and Trafficking in Children: A Discussion of
the Hague Conference Convention in Respect ofIntercountry Adoptions, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus.
L. 623,637 (1994).
The UN addressed these issues again in 1989 with the UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child. See generally Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3. The Convention on the Rights of the Child suffers from the same problems as it predecessors,
including a lack of detailed enforcement mechanisms. See Susan Kilbourne, Note, The
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Federalism Issues for the United States, 5 GEO. J.
FIGHTING POVERTY 327, 328 (1998).
12 Pfund, supra note 11, at 54.
"3 Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption, opened for signature May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167 (entered into force May 1,
1995) [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The United States signed the Hague Convention on
March 31, 1994, but has yet to ratify the document. Hague Conference on Private International
Law, Status Table, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=-conventions.status&cid=69 (last
visited June 26, 2005) [hereinafter Status Table].
The Hague Convention aims to create a Central Authority in each participating country
that will help curb baby-selling, coercion of birth mothers, and oppressive adoption processing
fees. Hague Convention, supra, arts. 6-9, 1870 U.N.T.S. at 184-85; see also U.S. Dep't of State,
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption and the Intercountry Adoption [sic] of 2000
Background (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter Background], http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/
convention/convention_2290.html. The Convention also aims to establish domestic
accreditation guidelines and standards for participating adoption service providers. See id.
Since 1994, efforts have been underway to implement, and thereby ratify, the Hague
Convention's requirements within the United States. See id.; U.S. Dep't of State, Preparations
forU.S. Implementation of the Hague Convention (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter Preparations], http://
travel.state.gov/family/adoption/convention/convention-2_2332.html. Ratification is dependent
upon execution of the provisions set forth in the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000. Id. The
Hague Convention, however, is weak in the areas of prohibitions and enforcement: there are no
outright provisions against baby-selling, no means with which to uncover baby-selling schemes
masquerading as legitimate adoptions service, and no punishments for violators. See supra note
11 ; Stein, supra note 9, at 76-77.
14 Passed by Congress in late September 2000, and signed into law by President Clinton on
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these two documents will reveal that both could have a detrimental impact on
American families and intercountry adoption. " A variety of solutions on both
the domestic and international levels will be examined, concluding that a
combination of actions must be taken in order to prevent disruption of
intercountry adoption and to secure the role of the U.S. federal government and
American families in this arena.
Because the Hague Convention and the IAA do not adequately address the
current problems with international adoption, and indeed will only create more
problems, this Note suggests solutions to the inadequacies of the Hague
Convention and the IAA. Furthermore, the IAA may prove unconstitutional.
To resolve these and other problems relating to intercountry adoption, the
United States may either refrain from ratifying the Hague Convention or seek
to amend either or both the Hague Convention and the IAA. The latter option
would require two steps. First, on the international level, the United States and
other member states can look to the Hague Convention itself and add
amendments that facilitate uncovering those who traffic in babies and
punishing baby-selling schemes.'6 Second, on the domestic level, the United
States can continue to allow state control over adoption agency accreditation
procedures and limit federal involvement. Limited federal involvement will
decrease costs added from having an entirely new level of federal bureaucracy
and decrease the amount of government invasion into citizens' private lives. 7
The decreased costs will continue to encourage the middle class to use Hague
Convention adoptions, while privacy protection will safeguard the concerns of
the wealthier. 8 The check of state law, in addition to the measures the federal
government is already taking, will continue to assure that international
adoptions are legitimate."
October 6, 2000, the IAA outlines new procedures for federal and state entities to follow in
implementing the Hague Convention. See Background, supra note 13. The IAA creates a
Central Authority in the State Department which will administer the accreditation and approval
of adoption service providers in the United States. See Preparations, supra note 13.
15 See infra Part III.
16 See Stein, supra note 9, at 77.
" See Cecere, supra note 7 (noting that larger, fully staffed, accredited agencies have had
no better success than smaller, community-based agencies).
IS See id. (stating that the less costly state licensing of agencies in most states is successful).
'9 See id. (stating that foreign adoption is successful and suggesting accreditation of only
those agencies that handle adoptions from certain high-risk countries).
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I. BACKGROUND ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
As the popularity of intercountry adoption has grown, adoption law has
shifted from a domestic to an international focus. If the United States ratifies
the Hague Convention and implements the IAA, adoption lawmaking would
move from individual states control to federal management.2"
A. Current Status of US. Law
The Hague Convention has not yet been ratified by the United States and
currently the requirements for intercountry adoption lie primarily with the
states with little federal intervention.2 There are, however, some general
federal rules imposed on all states by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Services.22
Before a child may enter the United States after adoption proceedings in his
home country, USCIS must approve a petition for immigration status by
determining that the parents can provide a home for the child and that the child
is an orphan.23 The petition will not be granted unless: (1) the prospective
parents are deemed fit under their state's laws and (2) federal officials believe
the state court will approve the adoption.24
In order to satisfy the first requirement, the adoptive family must undergo
two separate home studies conducted by both the state and federal officials.25
These home studies not only prepare and counsel the adoptive parents for the
20 See National Center for State Courts, Intercountry Adoption Act (P.L. 106-279), at http://
www.ncsconline.org/D-Gov/briefingbook/ 108thCongress/childwelfare 10 8th.html#Inter
countryAdoption (last visited June 23, 2005) (describing potential limitations on state power
under the IAA).
2' See Peter H. Pfund, Implementation of the Hague Intercountry Adoption Convention in
the United States: Issues and Problems, in E PLURIBUS UNUM, LIBER AMICORUM GEORGES A.L.
DROZ ON THE PROGRESSIVE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 321,322-26 (Alegra
BorrAs et al. eds. 1996) (describing the state of intercountry adoption law in the United States).
22 On March 1, 2003, service and benefit functions of the U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) transitioned into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
About Us, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/index.htm (last modified Apr. 1, 2005).
23 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(a)(2) (2005).
24 Gold, supra note 8, at 113.
21 Id. at 114.
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process of intercountry adoption, but also serve as an opportunity for officials
to assess the home environment.26
After a successful home study, the child must qualify as an orphan under
federal standards.27 A child may be considered an orphan when: (1) the child
is coming to the United States to be adopted by a citizen or has been adopted
abroad by a U.S. citizen;28 (2) the child had the "death or disappearance of,
abandonment or desertion by, or separation or loss from, both parents, or for
whom the sole or surviving parent is incapable of providing the proper care
and has in writing irrevocably released the child for emigration and
adoption. 2
9
After meeting these two requirements, the adoptive parents may file on
behalf of the child for United States citizenship, which will be granted once
there is proof that:
(1) At least one parent (or, at the time of his or her death, was) is
a citizen of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization.
(2) The United States citizen parent--
(A) has (or, at the time of his or her death, had) been
physically present in the United States or its outlying
possessions for a period or periods totaling not less than
five years, at least two of which were after attaining the
age of fourteen years; or (B) has (or, at the time of his or
her death, had) a citizen parent who has been physically
present in the United States or its outlying possessions for
a period or periods totaling not less than five years, at least
two of which were after attaining the age of fourteen
years.
(3) The child is under the age of eighteen years.
(4) The child is residing outside of the United States in the legal
and physical custody of the applicant (or, if the citizen parent is
deceased, an individual who does not object to the application).
(5) The child is temporarily present in the United States pursuant
to a lawful admission, and is maintaining such lawful status.3
26 id.
27 Id. at 115.
2 8 U.S.C. § 11O1(b)(1)(F)(i) (2004).
29 Id.
30 8 U.S.C. § 1433(a) (2005).
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Finally, the law of the individual states re-enters the picture to approve of
the adoption: the adoption must meet the requirements of the home state,
which most often consist of the termination of the biological parents' rights
and a court determination of the child's best interests.3
B. Development of the Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption
In an attempt to streamline the intercountry adoption and avoid abuses and
delays during the process, the Hague Conference on Private International Law
introduced the issue of intercountry adoption in its seventeenth session in the
spring of 1993.32 On May 29, 1993, the Hague Conference adopted the
Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption. 33 The Hague Convention sets out the importance of
children as a nation's priority and that intercountry adoption may be a child's
only opportunity for a permanent family life.34 In order to recognize these
concerns, the Hague Convention is designed first and foremost to protect the
interests of children and to ensure protection of both the birth and prospective
adoptive parents while preventing the practice of child trafficking and other
abuses of the intercountry adoption process.35
"' Gold, supra note 8, at 115-16.
32 Seegenerally Hague Conference on Private International Law, More About HCCH, http://
www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act-=text.display&tid=4 (last visited June 26, 2005). The
Conference is an organization of sixty-two member states that meets for the purpose of working
"for the progressive unification of the rules of private international law." See Statute of the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, July 15, 1955, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. 2228, 2228,220
U.N.T.S. 121, 121.
3" Hague Conference on Private International Law, Full Text of the Convention on the
Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, http://hcch.e-
vision.nl/index__en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69 (last visited June 26, 2005).
"4 Hague Convention, supra note 13, pmbl., 1870 U.N.T.S. at 182.
31 Pfund, supra note 11, at 54. The problem of child trafficking is one among several human
rights violations that advocacy groups have been trying to solve. See, e.g., UNICEF, Child
Protection: Trafficking and Exploitation, http://www.unicef.org/protection/index-exploitation.
html (last visited June 26, 2005). As many as 1.2 million children are trafficked each year for
labor or sexual exploitation. Id. Child trafficking affects all nations, developing and developed
alike. E.g., Woman Sentenced to 18 Months in Adoption Conspiracy, KOMO NEWS, Nov. 19,
2004, at http://www.komotv.com/news/printstory.asp?id=34062 (providing the story of a
Hawaiian woman sentenced to prison for helping Americans adopt Cambodian children, many
of whom were not orphans).
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The Hague Convention provisions apply to every adoption between
member states when "a child habitually resident in one Contracting State...
has been, is being, or is to be moved to another Contracting State ... either
after his or her adoption in the [first State] by spouses or a person habitually
resident in the [second State], or for the purposes of such an adoption in the
[second or first State]."36 An adoption can only take place after authorities in
both the state of origin and receiving state determine that Hague Convention
provisions have been satisfied.37
The state of origin must determine that the child in question is adoptable,
that intercountry adoption is the best choice for that child, and that parents
have consented to the child's adoption." Specifically, Article 4(c) of the
Hague Convention requires that "the persons, institutions and authorities
whose consent is necessary for adoption" have been informed and advised as
to the legal consequences of the adoption.39 The parties must also provide
consent freely and in writing only after the birth of the child, and this consent
will be valid as long as it is not given in exchange for compensation and has
not been withdrawn.4" Depending on the age and maturity of the child, the
origin state must also consult with the child to determine his wishes regarding
adoption and explain to him what will happen if he wants to be adopted.4
Once the state of origin has fulfilled all stated requirements, the adoption will
take place once the receiving state has interviewed and established that the
adoptive parents will be eligible under law to adopt the child.42 The receiving
state must counsel the prospective parents and also ensure that their child will
be authorized to enter the receiving state and permanently reside there with the
adoptive parents.4 3 Under Article 23, readoption in the receiving state is
considered unnecessary when the adoption has already occurred in the state of
origin,' and the receiving state can only refuse an adoption when "the
adoption is manifestly contrary to its public policy, taking into account the best
interests of the child., 45
36 Hague Convention, supra note 13, art. 2, 1870 U.N.T.S. at 182.
17 Id. arts. 4-5, 1870 U.N.T.S. at 183-84.
" Id. art. 4, 1870 U.N.T.S. at 183-84.
39 Id. art. 4(c)(1), 1870 U.N.T.S. at 184.
40 Id. art. 4(c)(3), 1870 U.N.T.S. at 184.
41 Id. art. 4(d), 1870 U.N.T.S. at 184.
42 Id. art. 5(a), 1870 U.N.T.S. at 184.
43 Id. art. 5(a)-(b), 1870 U.N.T.S. at 184.
4 Id. art. 23, 1870 U.N.T.S. at 189.
41 Id. art. 24, 1870 U.N.T.S. at 189.
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C. Creation of a Central Authority
In order to facilitate intercountry adoption, the state of origin and the
receiving state are to communicate with each other through a designated
Central Authority in each state. 6 Articles 6 and 7 require every party to create
a Central Authority and each entity to cooperate with each other, exchange
information, and promote the aims and goals of the Hague Convention.47 The
Hague Convention does not specifically require one central agency, but it
states that "Federal States, States with more than one system of law or States
having autonomous territorial units shall be free to appoint more than one
Central Authority and to specify the territorial or personal extent of their
functions." '4
The duties of the Central Authority in each state are quite extensive under
the Hague Convention. Not only is each state required to communicate and
facilitate the goals of the Hague Convention through information exchange
with other states' Central Authorities, but there is a long list of functions that
each must undertake within its own state. Under Articles 8 and 9, the Central
Authority must prevent improper financial gain from activities associated with
international adoption, oversee adoption counseling and post-adoption
services, exchange evaluation reports, and respond "to justified requests from
other Central Authorities" with regard to any shared adoption situations.4 9
Finally, member states accredit adoption service providers within its borders
in order to certify them to participate in international adoptions under Hague
Convention standards. 50
D. Intercountry Adoption Act of2000
Implementation of the Hague Convention is particularly important to the
United States because it receives over 20,000 children through international
adoption per year.5" Steps toward implementing the Hague Convention in the
United States were not taken until 1998 when President Clinton presented the
46 Id. arts. 6-7, 1870 U.N.T.S. at 184-85.
47 Id.
48 Id. art. 6(2), 1870 U.N.T.S. at 185.
49 Id. arts. 8-9, 1870 U.N.T.S. at 185.
'0 Id. arts. 10-12, 1870 U.N.T.S. at 186.
"1 See U.S. Dep't of State, Immigrant Visas Issued to Orphans Coming to the U.S., http://
www.travel.state.gov/family/adoption/stats/stats-451.html (last visited June 26, 2005)
[hereinafter Immigrant Visas].
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Hague Convention to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.5 2
During the summer of 2000, the House of Representatives and the Senate both
passed bills outlining implementation procedures for the Hague Convention,
and these two bills were reconciled as the IAA.53 The main purposes of the
IAA include:
(1) to provide for implementation by the United States of the
Convention;
(2) to protect the rights of, and prevent abuses against, children,
birth families, and adoptive parents involved in adoptions (or
prospective adoptions) subject to the Convention, and to ensure
that such adoptions are in the children's best interests; and
(3) to improve the ability of the Federal Government to assist
United States citizens seeking to adopt children from abroad and
residents of other countries party to the Convention seeking to
adopt children from the United States.54
President Clinton signed the IAA into law on October 6,2000, and pending
final implementation of IAA requirements, the Senate will ratify the Hague
Convention.55 Between October 2000 and the present, the U.S. Department of
State has been preparing federal regulations:
Department of State promulgation of regulations (1) establishing
requirements/procedures for the designation and monitoring of
accrediting entities; (2) setting the standards that must be met for
non-profit adoption agencies to qualify for Convention accredita-
tion and for other agencies and individuals to qualify for Conven-
tion approval; (3) governing the registration of smaller
community-based agencies for temporary accreditation; and (4)
providing the procedures and requirements for incoming and
outgoing Convention adoptions.56
52 Background, supra note 13.
53 Id.
54 42 U.S.C. § 14901(b) (2000).
" Background, supra note 13.
56 Preparations, supra note 13.
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The new system will create relationships among all of the traditional actors
involved in intercountry adoption in the United States, including the federal
government, state governments, adoption service providers, and those wishing
to become adoptive parents.57 The IAA proposes to establish the United States
Central Authority (USCA) in the U.S. Department of State." The Office of
Children's Issues in the Bureau of Consular Affairs of the U.S. Department of
State performs all USCA functions.59 It will have supreme authority to act
within the United States to implement the requirements of the Hague
Convention and to serve as the contact for other Central Authorities wishing
to communicate with the United States on intercountry adoptions.6" The actual
adoption services will still be provided and coordinated by individual adoption
service providers and adoption agencies, the new condition being that these
entities must qualify for accreditation through the USCA.61 All intercountry
adoptions will be tracked through the USCA with the Department of Homeland
Security.62 The USCA will track all accredited agencies and persons in order
to ensure that the activities they undertake in the intercountry adoption process
are in line with both federal and Hague Convention regulations.63
In 2001, after the passage of the IAA, the State Department awarded Acton
Burnell, Inc. (now CACI AB, Inc.) a contract to create the standards and
procedure guidelines for accreditation of adoption service providers.' They
are entrusted with the job of preparing a draft for public comment and a
framework for the contractual relationships which will exist between adoption
service providers and the entities that will work to provide them with
accreditation.65 Since receiving the government contract, CACI AB, an
information technology consulting firm, has worked with adoptees, adoptive
families, agencies, accreditors, advocacy groups, attorneys, and social workers
in order to gather comments to better equip itself to draft the accreditation
"1 Pfund, supra note 21, at 321.
58 U.S. Dep't of State, IAA: Summary of Provisions (Apr. 2005), at http://travel.state.
gov/family/adoption/convention/convention2308.html.
59 U.S. Dep't of State, How Will the United States Implement the Hague Convention? (Apr.
2005), at http://travel.state.gov/family/adoption/convention/convention-2313.html.
60 Id.
61 id.
62 Id.
63 id.
' Hague Adoption Standards Project, http://www.hagueregs.org/index.htm (last modified
Jan. 26, 2004).
65 id.
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guidelines. 66 The scheduled completion date for the project was July 31,2001,
and although a preliminary draft was completed by that time, the project
underwent an extension for final completion.67 A second draft finally resulted
in official publication in the Federal Register on September 15, 2003, more
than two years after the scheduled completion date.68 The process of drafting
guidelines for accreditation of adoption services providers is still ongoing, as
the State Department reviews the public comments it received following the
official publication of the proposed rules.69
The United States is on the verge of placing intercountry adoption law
within the federal domain. Ratifying the Hague Convention and using the IAA
to implement the Hague Convention's requirements in the United States, will
change the traditionally state-oriented adoption approval process. The USCA
will take the place of the current system, and, supposedly, all international
adoptions will meet Hague Convention standards.7" There are, however,
reasons to believe that merging the Hague Convention into U.S. law will not
be easy, or perhaps even possible.
Ill. THE DIFFICULTY OF MERGING THE HAGUE CONVENTION INTO
UNITED STATES LAW
Despite serious flaws in the Hague Convention,71 the United States has
proceeded towards its implementation by passing the IAA.7" The LAA,
however, may be unconstitutional. While the federal government has several
justifications for the IAA's constitutionality, an unclear future of the Hague
Convention in the United States could have severe economic and personal
consequences for U.S. citizens.73 The United States' inability to participate in
the Hague Convention could also cause an increase in non-Hague Convention
adoptions,74 or a withdrawal of Hague Convention member countries from the
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 id.
70 See Stein, supra note 9, at 76.
71 Id.
72 Background, supra note 13.
71 S. REP. No. 106-276, at 13-16 (2000).
71 See The Intercountry Adoption Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 2909 Before the House
Comm. on International Relations, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Jenista Testimony]
(statement of Jerri Ann Jenista, Adopted Group).
[Vol. 33:621
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
treaty. In order to avoid this situation, the United States will have to
implement solutions on both the international and domestic level.
A. Flaws in the Hague Convention
While the Hague Convention is fairly specific about the general require-
ments that a party must accede to in order to carry out its goals, it is not
without some serious flaws that could render it ineffective: it does not make
baby-selling illegal; there are no punishments for those who engage in baby-
selling; the Convention does not regulate independent adoptions conducted by
private individuals as opposed to adoption service providers; and the
Convention provides no methods for uncovering illegitimate adoption service
providers.75
First, the Hague Convention proposes to prevent trafficking in children and
baby-selling but fails to specifically state that such practices are illegal or
require parties to the Hague Convention to punish those that attempt these
practices. 76 Parties to the Hague Convention cannot rely on procedural
requirements for intercountry adoption to lead to the prevention of baby-selling
because these guidelines are not strong enough to prevent those interested in
the lucrative profits to be dissuaded by the threat of any realistic
consequences.77
Second, the Hague Convention fails to address the practice of independent
adoptions, one of the biggest sources of baby-selling.7 8
Finally, even if the Hague Convention provided some means of deterring
baby-selling, it certainly does not lend parties any tools, such as investigative
powers, for uncovering baby-selling rings purporting to be legitimate adoption
service providers. 79 These schemes can continue to operate under the Hague
Convention. 0
Even considering the call of critics for the implementation of a Hague
Convention with stricter guidelines in regards to baby-selling,8' the United
States has slowly pressed forward towards signing and implementing the
" Stein, supra note 9, at 76.
76 Id.
77 Id.
" Id. Independent adoptions are those that are conducted by private individuals as opposed
to adoption service providers or adoption agencies. Id.
19 Id. at 76-77.
so Id
"' Id. at 77.
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Hague Convention in its current form. In order for the United States to ratify
the Hague Convention by the proposed deadline of 2006, implementation of
the Hague Convention requirements must take place.82 The lengthy require-
ments of the Hague Convention have confronted the United States with
"difficult legal and political challenges ... more related to the procedures
involved in the implementation of the Convention's requirements than to the
substantive requirements themselves."83
B. Why the Intercountry Adoption Act May Be Problematic and How the
Federal Government Will Attempt to Justify the Constitutionality of the Act
Although endorsed by many adoption service providers in the United States
and quickly passed through the House and Senate, the IAA presents some
problems under U.S. law which will have an impact internationally. First and
foremost, the LAA encroaches upon a traditional area of state law.84 Adoption
laws, along with "laws related to marriage, divorce, matrimonial property,
child support, [and] child custody.., are part of the common law or have been
enacted by the legislatures of the individual States of the United States and are
interpreted and applied by the courts of those States."" Before the IAA, there
was little federal law on intercountry adoptions, and the federal government
was only involved in intercountry adoptions to the extent that it functioned to
ensure that parents were eligible to adopt and that the child was eligible under
the Immigration and Nationality Act to come to the United States to live with
his adoptive parents.8 6 Now, the role of the federal government is greatly
expanded. The federal government has taken over the traditional activities of
the states' executive and legislative branches, such as state licensing of
adoption service providers, by regulating accreditation of adoption services
providers.87 The new law no longer allows state courts to finalize adoptions
for children immigrating to the United States who are covered by the
Convention without the involvement of the Secretary of State.88 Additionally,
state courts cannot finalize adoptions of children emigrating from the United
82 Meghan Hendy, Joint Council on International Children's Services, Hague Convention:
Next Steps for the United States (2004), available at http://www.jcics.org/HagueNextSteps.pdf.
8" Pfund, supra note 21, at 321.
84 Id. at 322-23.
I ld. at 322.
8I Id. at 323.
87 See Preparations, supra note 13.
88 National Center for State Courts, supra note 20.
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States without verifying "that the Convention requirements have been met."8 9
The fact that the IAA preempts an area of law traditionally reserved to the
states will not go unnoticed by those who wish for that power to remain in the
states.
The federal government may face the risk of constitutional attack on its
powers to implement the Hague Convention within the United States because
the power to regulate adoption has traditionally been a state function.9" The
LAA may be unable to survive an attack based on any of the following
challenges: the Commerce Clause, treaty powers, the anti-commandeering
principle, and the Tenth Amendment.
1. Commerce Clause
The principal argument advanced by the federal government to support
Congress' encroachment on the area of adoption law is likely to lie within the
Commerce Clause.9' Article I, Section 8 (3) of the U.S. Constitution provides
that Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States.... "92 The federal government will likely claim that
because international adoption is a process that involves traffic and exchanges
with foreign governments, the power to regulate rests with Congress. 93 This
argument is easily defeated by examining the policy concerns and intentions
of the Hague Convention. One of the principal goals of the Hague Convention
is to prevent "the sale of, or traffic in children,"'94 and Congress cannot
simultaneously adhere to the principles of the Hague Convention while
claiming that children are articles of commerce fit for its regulation.
Additionally, recent Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Lopez95
and United States v. Morrison9 6 have reined in Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. According to Lopez, Congress can only pass valid
legislation under the Commerce Clause in three categories: (1) the "channels
of interstate commerce ... (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce. .. and (3) those activities having a
89 Id.
90 Cecere, supra note 7.
91 Gold, supra note 8, at 121-22.
92 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
" Gold, supra note 8, at 121-22.
9' Hague Convention, supra note 13, at pmbl., 1870 U.N.T.S. at 182.
9' 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
96 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce." 97 The determination of whether an activity
is considered "commerce" depends upon the economic qualities of the activity.
If an "economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce," then
Congress may regulate it; if not, Congress may not interfere. 9
The United States Supreme Court's reasoning is that if Congress were free
to regulate in any area remotely related to interstate commerce, the Court
would be "hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is
without power to regulate."99 And the court would be forced to "convert
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power
of the sort retained by the States."' l° The Court declared that it would not
longer acquiesce to Congress's use of the Commerce Clause as an instrument
for wide-reaching power.' If a challenge to IAA's usurpation of state power
in the area of adoption law were to reach the Supreme Court, there is a distinct
possibility that the legislation could be struck down as unconstitutional on
Commerce Clause grounds. Thus the federal government is unlikely to be
successful legitimizing federal regulation of adoption under the Commerce
Clause.
2. Treaty Power
The IAA could also be challenged under Congress's treaty power.
According to Missouri v. Holland, treaties are the supreme law of the land
under Article VI of the Constitution.'12 The federal government could claim
that under the treaty power, Congress is able to impose the rules of the Hague
Convention upon the nation as the law of the land. There are, however,
limitations on congressional treaty making powers. Specifically, "what an act
of Congress could not do unaided, in derogation of the powers reserved to the
States, a treaty cannot do."'103 In other words, when Congress attempts to
regulate in areas not permitted by the Constitution, and then tries to justify its
actions as pursuant to its treaty powers, this legislation will be deemed
unconstitutional. As applied to the Hague Convention, the federal government
97 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
98 Id. at 560.
99 Id. at 564.
'0o Id. at 567.
101 See id.
102 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,432 (1920).
103 Id.
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is free to enter into treaties with foreign governments and, therefore, the Hague
Convention would be considered a valid act of Congress. However, the chosen
methods of implementing the Hague Convention are arguably usurpations of
powers that Congress could not otherwise do without the Hague Convention
treaty. Allowing Congress to do so would be "manifestly contrary to the
objectives of those who created the Constitution... to construe Article VI as
permitting the United States to exercise power under an international
agreement without observing constitutional prohibitions. In effect, such
construction would permit amendment of that document in a manner not
sanctioned by Article V."'" The IAA would therefore be unconstitutional.
3. The Anti-Commandeering Principle
The IAA would also be deemed unconstitutional if Congress were accused
of commandeering the state executive branches. Indeed, "[while] Congress has
substantial powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate
concern to the States, the Constitution has never been understood to confer
upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to
Congress' instructions ... ,'105 Congress has the ability to encourage States
through its power of the purse to pass legislation that it prefers or to preempt
contradictory laws through the supremacy clause; it does not, however, have
the ability to craft legislation and direct the states to regulate in a way
Congress chooses. 0 6 State executive branches also cannot be compelled to
administer federal programs. 7 With respect to the IAA, it commandeers both
the executive branch of the state governments and state resources by placing
the burden of implementation of the new federal licensing procedures on state
executive officials.' State instrumentalities that currently are responsible for
licensing adoption service providers will now be forced to undertake a list of
specified functions for accrediting entities, in addition to their local domestic
adoption duties." 9 These functions include accreditation and approval of
agencies and persons; ongoing monitoring of these approved entities; review
of complaints against them; enforcement of sanctions; data and record keeping;
and regular reports to the Secretary of State, the USCA, state courts, and others
104 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
0' New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992).
106 Id. at 166-68.
107 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997).
'0" 42 U.S.C. § 14922 (2000).
109 42 U.S.C. § 14922(b).
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"to the extent and in the manner that the Secretary requires."' 0 The require-
ments of the IAA will certainly impede state officials from performing their
local duties; therefore, precious state resources will be diverted from domestic
adoptions and focused on Hague Convention adoptions.
4. The Tenth Amendment
The IAA would also be unable to survive an attack based on the Tenth
Amendment. The Tenth Amendment provides that "the powers not delegated
to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' " The Court would
probably favor a Tenth Amendment argument stating that the power to regulate
adoption is reserved to the states since it was not delegated to Congress by the
Constitution. While United States v. Sage"2 recently rejected such a Tenth
Amendment argument against the enforcement of the Child Support Recovery
Act, where the petitioner argued that family relations were reserved to the
states and that the Act usurped state power, this rejection was based upon the
fact that the Act "did not regulate domestic relations per se, but only assisted
the states' enforcement of state court orders."' 3 A challenge to the LAA based
on the Tenth Amendment can be easily distinguished because the IAA is not
legislation drafted to assist states in enforcing state adoption law; rather,
imposes new regulations upon domestic relations within the states and directs
them to take new procedures in congruence with the Hague Convention
guidelines.
5. The Viability of the Intercountry Adoption Act
The above arguments suggest that the federal government's power to
regulate intercountry adoption is untenable. In the future, states or parents
could challenge the IAA's constitutionality on grounds under the Commerce
Clause, treaty power, the anti-commandeering principle, or the Tenth
Amendment. At least, the above arguments show several levels on which the
IAA can be criticized. However, the legislation currently stands and the
effects of its implementation must be examined.
110 Id.
U.. .S. CONST. amend. X.
2 92F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996).
13 Gold, supra note 8, at 122.
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C. The Future of the Hague Convention in the United States
The international implications of the failure of U.S. implementation of the
Hague Convention could be quite damaging because of the demand for
intercountry adoption in the United States. Because of the problems with the
IAA, U.S. citizens may seek to avoid the Hague Convention standards by
adopting from countries that are not parties to the Convention. This could
result in a second track of adoptions where no standards exist;114 the benefits
of operating out from under Hague Convention guidelines could then
encourage Hague Convention party countries to withdraw from the treaty,
resulting in yet another failure of world-wide regulation of intercountry
adoption.'15 Even if the IAA is able to withstand the aforementioned
constitutional arguments, litigation surrounding the issue is likely to postpone
the scheduled ratification and to place other member countries on notice that
Hague Convention implementation in the United States may not proceed
smoothly." 6 If any of the arguments succeed in convincing the Supreme Court
to find the IAA unconstitutional, the United States will be forced to refrain
from ratification date and will have to redraft suitable implementation
legislation. This outcome would certainly give rise to concern about the future
of the Hague Convention because "many nations are withholding action on the
convention until they see what the United States does.""' 7 A questionable
future for the Hague Convention could slow or even halt future ratification by
other countries and discourage current member states from continuing to abide
by its guidelines." 8 The possibility that the United States may never become
a party to the Hague Convention could certainly defeat the Hague Conven-
tion's purpose.
The future of the Hague Convention will remain uncertain even if the [AA
is successfully implemented in the United States and ratification is able to take
place in 2006. The manner in which Congress has interpreted the Hague
Convention and drafted the IAA could cause serious domestic problems within
the United States. These problems could lead to national protest to withdraw
from the Hague Convention altogether.
14 Jenista Testimony, supra note 74.
.. See supra note 11.
..6 See Rhonda McMillion, 'Save the Children 'More Urgent, 86-Jan A.B.A. J. 94,94 (2000).
117 Id.
IIS See id.
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1. Economic Consequences of Hague Convention Implementation
Initially, the first changes the American public will recognize will be the
economic consequences of implementation." 9 It is estimated that creation and
continuing operation of the USCA will cost U.S. citizens four million dollars
per year. 20 This estimate is just the expected costs for the hiring of personnel
and the creation of a computerized tracking system which will house a
database of both Hague Convention and non-Hague Convention adoptions. 2 '
To recover these costs, the State Department will be allowed to charge fees to
adopting parents for its services and to levy fines against violators of JAA
provisions.122 It is projected that the State Department would charge a $200
fee on each of the approximately 20,000 adoptions each year.'23 These are
only the beginning of "new fees" that the federal government will be able to
charge under the authorization of the IAA. Because Congress chose to have
one national Central Authority rather than a number of local Central Authori-
ties, as is allowed by the Hague Convention, 121 the state licenses of adoption
service providers will no longer be valid. 2 Instead, all adoption service
providers must apply to the USCA designated accreditation entities in order to
operate.'26 Under the new USCA standards, operation will entail new
procedures and requirements in order to conform to the Hague Convention that
will cost adoption service providers to implement. Most significantly, service
providers must pay accreditation charges and fees to the Secretary of State,
provide parent training programs, and only employ agency approved, licensed
social workers. 27 These fees, in addition to other costs accrued because of
new requirements for administration, extensive record keeping, and reporting
to the USCA, will undoubtedly increase the costs of intercountry adoption.'28
Because "there is not a business or institution that does not pass on the costs
of regulation," we can expect these fees to be passed on to the general public,
"9 S. REP. No. 106-276, at 13-16 (2000) (containing the Congressional Budget Office's
estimate of the cost of the Intercountry Adoption Act).
120 Id. at 15.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 id.
124 See Hague Convention, supra note 13, art. 6(2), 1870 U.N.T.S. at 185.
125 See 42 U.S.C. 14901 (2000).
126 See id.
127 Joe Mazzarella, Parents for International Adoption Analysis (Apr. 26, 2000) (discussing
the Intercountry Adoption Act) (copy on file with author).
128 Id.
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specifically to prospective adoptive parents.'29 The cost of intercountry
adoption is barely within the reach of most middle class families now, ranging
between $20,000 to $35,000.3 0 The addition of new costs and fees will
probably put the choice of intercountry adoption beyond the reach of the
middle class. This presents an issue of elitist adoption where only wealthier
American families will be able to afford to participate in the process of
international adoption. 3 '
2. Impact of Hague Convention Implementation on the Privacy of U.S.
Citizens
U.S. citizens who are able to participate in intercountry adoption face
potential invasion of their private lives. Currently, the common home study
process includes an evaluation of the following information about the
prospective adoptive parents: family background, education, employment,
relationships, daily life, parenting, the neighborhood in which they live,
religion, and feelings about or their readiness for adoption.' This information
is gathered through the following mechanisms: a home visit (often including
a health and fire department inspection), a physical exam, income statements,
background checks, an autobiographical statement, and references.' This
information is collected so that a social worker may write a final home study
report, which will serve to introduce a family to adoption agencies and
adoption exchange services so that families can be matched to waiting
children.' 34
Under section 401(b) of the IAA, there is some ambiguity about record
disclosure and who will have access to an individual's sensitive information. "'
Subsection (1) seems to prohibit the disclosure of information while simulta-
neously allowing an exception when disclosure is "permitted or required by
129 Id.
130 Law Firm of Braselton and Millard, International Adoption: The Choice: International
versus Domestic?, http://adoption-law-illinois.com/adopt-international.html (last visited June
26, 2005).
"' See Jenista Testimony, supra note 74.
132 NATIONALADOPTION INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE, U.S. DEP'T OFHEALTH ANDHUMAN
SERVICES, THE ADOPTION HOME STUDY PROCESS 4 (2004), available at http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/
pubs/Lhomstu.pdf
... Id. at 2-3.
134 Id. at 1.
131 Mazzarella, supra note 127.
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applicable law."' 36 Subsection (2) describes yet another exception allowing
disclosure of sensitive information to many parties "only to the extent
necessary to administerthe [Hague] Convention or this Act."'137 Section 102(e)
allows the Secretary of State to establish a registry of all adoption cases,
Hague Convention or non-Hague Convention, and permits "tracking... and
retrieval of information on both pending and closed cases."' 3'  These
exceptions increase the potential that sensitive, private information could leak.
The registry is a database pool of thousands of immigrating children containing
background information on their prospective parents gathered by accredited
agencies through the home study requirement.'39 Considering that private
information could be released to parties or for purposes that the legislation is
unwilling to clearly name, many U.S. citizens that can otherwise participate in
the international adoption process may be dissuaded from doing so by such an
intrusion.
It is clear that even if the IAA survives all constitutional challenges, as it
currently stands it may muddle the international adoption process rather than
streamline it. Because of the projected economic consequences and privacy
concerns the IAA raises, the act is being positioned for failure before it is even
put into operation.
D. The International Consequences of U.S. Implementation of the Hague
Convention
Without the participation of the U.S. in the Hague Convention, it will be
difficult for the treaty to be successful. The United States receives over 20,000
children a year through international adoptions. 4 ' Ifthe United States does not
receive children through the Hague Convention standards, states currently part
of the treaty that hope to send children to the United States may no longer have
an incentive to abide by their duties under the agreement. "' These countries
may withdraw from the Hague Convention, undermining the efficacy of that
treaty, and begin working to make children eligible for adoption in other ways.
136 42 U.S.C. § 14941(b)(1) (2000).
137 Id. § 14941(b)(2).
'3 Id. § 14912(e).
139 Id. § 14921(b)(1).
140 Immigrant Visas, supra note 51.
'"" See McMillion, supra note 116, at 94.
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This would cause two parallel systems of international adoption in the United
States. 1
42
With sections of the American population unable to participate in Hague
Convention adoptions because of monetary issues, or unwilling to participate
because of government intrusion, the potential for a second track of interna-
tional adoptions exists. The demand for an alternative to Hague Convention
adoptions will encourage someone to seek to meet this demand, and this
encouragement will come in the form of economic benefit and efficiency. If
adoptions from other countries can come cheaper and quicker than adoptions
through the Hague Convention, these will clearly become more appealing to
parents who desire to have a child in the fastest and most cost efficient way.
This second track will become the first choice among prospective adoptive
parents while adoptions from Hague Convention parties fall by the wayside.
With the ability to cut through the red tape, paperwork, and extra costs, the
second track will also attract other countries considering Hague Convention
ratification and negatively influence that decision.
The second track could also become a place where baby-selling continues
to thrive unchecked by any sort of regulations that the Hague Convention could
potentially offer to dissuade the practice. It is evident that a misstep by the
United States in its implementation of the Hague Convention could lead to the
creation of this second track of intemcountry adoption, the continuation of
baby-selling practices that the Hague Convention sought to eradicate, and the
eventual collapse of the Hague Convention community.
Additionally, countries that have already become a party to the Hague
Convention could decide to withdraw once they realize that Americans no
longer desire to adopt children from there. Without access to one of the major
receiving states in the world, countries would have no incentives to abide by
the more stringent Hague Convention standards. Thus, current member
countries would choose to opt out of the Hague Convention and seek
participation in the second track of intercountry adoptions.
E. Possible Solutions to Problems Posed by the Hague Convention and the
Intercountry Adoption Act
The flaws in both the Hague Convention and the IAA can be corrected. At
the international level, the Hague Convention can be amended and strength-
ened. If this does not take place, the United States can make modifications to
142 See Jenista Testimony, supra note 74.
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the IAA so that the flaws in the Hague Convention will not adversely affect
U.S. citizens.
1. At the International Level
What can be done to rescue the Hague Convention? At the international
level, a number of solutions have been proposed to repair the loopholes in the
Hague Convention. One suggestion is to modify the Hague Convention so that
it is more similar to the Uniform Adoption Act.'43 The Uniform Adoption Act
(UAA) was promulgated in the United States in 1994 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as an attempt to bring
uniformity and consistency to the domestic adoption laws among the fifty
states.4'" The UAA imposes stringent consent requirements upon biological
parents, coupled with a fixed 192 hour period of revocation after which freely
given consent is irrevocable. 45 Including these standards in the Hague
Convention could help to reach the goal of reducing baby-selling. During the
time period in which the birth parent has to change his or her mind, officials
can work to ensure that the consent given after the baby's birth was indeed
proper and freely given.'46 Consent exchanged for any form of consideration
would have a higher chance of being discovered and guilty consciences on the
part of biological parents would have time to come to the surface.7"' Including
within the Hague Convention the UAA requirement of impartial counseling for
birth parents prior to their giving consent for the adoption can further reduce
baby-selling.'48 Additionally, a third party could be required to witness the
transfer by written consent. 49 The UAA requires that the third party be either
a government official or professional person. 50 Although such witnesses
could be paid off in order to continue the baby-selling scheme, such a
143 Stein, supra note 9, at 77.
'44 Id. at 53.
145 See UNF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-404, 9 U.L.A. 28 (1994), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/uaa94.htm.
146 Stein, supra note 9, at 80.
147 id.
149 id.
149 Id.
150 See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-405, 9 U.L.A. 28 (1994), available at http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fiact99/1990s/uaa94.hun.
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requirement would work more often than not to reduce the possibility of
success in baby-selling. 5'
The UAA's more rigorous standards on parental consent, impartial
adoption counseling, and witnesses of written consent will make the Hague
Convention tougher on baby-selling.'52 While these guidelines are not as
strong as specific punishments, they will solve one of the principal problems
with the Hague Convention: making it harder on baby-sellers to traffic in
children. '
2. In the United States
If the Hague Convention is not altered or amended, the United States can
make choices so that the flaws in the treaty will not affect U.S. citizens. The
most expensive and time consuming choice would be to pass the IAA as is and
have it struck down through lawsuits challenging its constitutionality. A better
choice would be not to implement the IAA as it now stands. Intercountry
adoptions can still continue to proceed with countries that have not yet signed
and ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention, and the United States can
simply stop engaging in intercountry adoptions with those states that have done
so. A number of the states that have already ratified or acceded to the treaty
are not the largest source countries from which United States adopts.' 54 In fact,
China and Russia, the largest source countries for the United States, have
refrained from ratifying or acceding to the Hague Convention. ' " In essence,
the status quo for intercountry adoption will remain intact, and future action
can be taken to draft an agreement that better addresses international adoption
and baby-selling.
Furthermore, if the United States makes it clear to the international
community that it has no intention of ever becoming a party to the Hague
Convention, it could encourage other nations to withdraw or convene in order
to reconsider the stipulations of the Hague Convention. The United States
could choose to wait until the next meeting of the Hague Conference to
reconsider the subject, or, under the statute of the Conference, the United
' Stein, supra note 9, at 80.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Immigrant Visas, supra note 51 (listing largest source countries by number of U.S.
adoption visas issued for Fiscal Year 2004: China, 7044; Russia, 5865; Guatemala, 3264).
"' Status Table, supra note 13.
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States could request an Extraordinary Session. 5 6 Reconsideration of the
Hague Convention guidelines could then result in a stronger, more global
effort to meet the goals of the original agreement.
Alternatively, the United States could amend the IAA to change implemen-
tation of the Hague Convention. By taking care of some of the weaknesses of
the Hague Convention within the implementing legislation, the United States
would be able to better provide its citizens with the assurance that intercountry
adoptions will continue to be successful and legal. One of the key problems
with the Hague Convention is that it fails to provide strong standards,
guidelines, and punishments for international adoption and baby-selling. The
United States, however, is free through the IAA to impose more stringent
standards upon its own citizens and adoption service providers to assure that
every child entering the country is given up for adoption freely and without
illegal entanglements.
The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute'5 7 has suggested three critical
amendments to the IAA and is currently urging the State Department to
consider them in its implementation of the LAA. ' First, U.S. adoption service
providers should be directly responsible for monetary transactions that occur
between the United States and adoption service providers' contractors or
agents located in foreign countries, while also remaining accountable to
parents regarding agency fees.5 9 A complete accounting of all funds
exchanged (and for what purposes) would help to limit or extinguish the
156 Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, supra note 32, art. 3, 220
U.N.T.S. at 125. In order to call for an Extraordinary Session, all member nations must approve
a request to the government of the Netherlands, the Standing Government Committee of the
Hague Conference. Id. The government of the Netherlands has the power to make this decision
considering that the Hague Conference is under the delegation of the Netherlands Standing
Government Committee. Id.
' "The Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, founded in 1996, is a national not-for-profit
organization devoted to improving adoption policy and practice." The Evan B. Donaldson
Adoption Institute, Who We Are, at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/whowe/intro.html (last
visited June 27, 2005).
"The Adoption Institute is a reliable, unbiased and respected voice for ethical adoption
practices that respect all people touched by adoption." Id. The Institute's mission is to "improve
the quality of information about adoption, enhance the understanding and perception of
adoption, and advance adoption policy and practice." Id.
158 internationalAdoptions: Problems and Solutions: Hearing on the Hague Convention and
the Intercountry Adoption Act (1AA) Before the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, May 22, 1998,
available at http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/policy/hagueregs.html (testimony of Cindy
Freidmutter, Executive Director, Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute).
159 Id.
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possibility of baby-selling. It is logical to connect the large amounts of cash
that American couples are recommended to carry abroad with unethical or
additional fees or "donations."''
60
Secondly, contracts between adoptions service providers and prospective
parents should be reformed to better "create a fair and clear business
relationship with respect to services, fees and legal responsibility."16' Results
from a survey of 1600 adoptive parents revealed that fifteen percent had an
agency withhold or give inaccurate information about a child.'62 Another
fifteen percent reported that information was withheld or inaccurately given
about the adoption process, and fourteen percent endured higher adoption fees
than their agency had quoted. 163
Finally, the Institute suggested that parents would be better protected if they
were simply offered more information with which to make a more informed
choice about the international adoption process and possible adoption service
providers." 6 Their survey also revealed that thirteen percent of families were
not pleased with the service they received from their adoption service provider,
and fourteen percent would not recommend their adoption service provider to
other families.'65 Accordingly, the Institute recommends that the U.S. State
Department consider consumer education, perhaps through an annual
publication of a consumer handbook on adoption service providers and the
process, along with a report card detailing the advantages and disadvantages
of certain types of agencies.'66 Also, the Institute has outlined a number of
additional ways in which the State Department can improve the overall quality
of the international adoption experience.'67
In addition to the recommendations by the Evan B. Donaldson Adoption
Institute regarding the adoption process and the adoption service providers, the
provisions of the LAA could be strengthened by imposing severe penalties
160 Id.
161 id.
162 Id.
163 id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. (including strategies such as: (I)mandating liability insurance; (2) guaranteeing parents
and adopted persons access to any and all information in their adoption records; (3) requiring
providers to bear legal responsibility for their domestic and foreign agents; (4) creating
ombudsman or other independent entity to accept complaints about adoption service providers;
and (5) identifying adoption service providers whose performance is inadequate and quickly
revoking their accreditation). Id.
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upon those who do not abide by its guidelines. While the IAA does impose
criminal and civil penalties for any violation of the IAA standards,16 the
United States could make it clear that it would work to impose these penalties
just as strictly on foreign, as well as domestic, violators of Hague Convention
adoptions to the United States.
Perhaps the best way to amend the IAA to achieve these objectives is to
disperse the powers of the Central Authority among the fifty states.' 69 The
current flow of regulatory power in the United States is moving away from the
national level and back to the states. 7 ' The states may be better equipped to
handle thejob of intercountry adoptions. Because adoption law functions have
historically been with the states and a strong constitutional argument exists that
they should remain there, Congress should seriously reconsider the arguments
for placing Central Authority power in the federal government.'7 ' By keeping
these responsibilities with the states, the federal government will not face the
risk of a constitutional attack on its powers to implement the Hague Conven-
tion within the United States. By reducing the risk that the Hague Convention
will be challenged and subjected to time consuming litigation, the United
States will be better prepared to establish consistency in regards to the new
adoption laws at home and how it will interact with other party nations.
Additionally, by placing this power with state accreditation agencies that
already have licensing procedures in place, few changes to the operating
procedures would need to take place.' 72 This would help reduce the amount
of confusion that would exist not only for state and federal officials but also
for prospective adoptive parents. Fewer changes would also mean much lower
expenditures for implementing the Hague Convention guidelines. State
resources that are already allocated towards intercountry adoption can continue
to work for the benefits of their own citizens. Maintaining the current
intercountry adoption system structure would be far less expensive and much
more efficient. Reducing the amount of money associated with a successful
intercountry adoption will help keep that option open for couples who want to
' 42 U.S.C. § 14944 (2000) (including civil penalties that may be any penalty prescribed
by law or monetary penalty of not more than $50,000 for first-time violation and not more than
$100,000 for any violation after first; criminal penalties may be applied only to those who
"knowingly and willfully" violate the act and those persons shall be subject to a criminal fine of
not more than $250,000, no more than five years in prison, or both).
169 Cecere, supra note 7.
170 Pfund, supra note 21, at 325.
"' Cecere, supra note 7.
172 Id.
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start a family, whether they are middle or upper class individuals. '73 Reducing
the possibility of excessive costs will also help reduce the possibility of a
second track adoption arena which would be free from Hague Convention
standards and more susceptible to corruption. 74
An amendment to the IAA placing powers with the state governments
would also induce the wealthy to choose Hague Convention adoptions. While
these persons, unlike the middle classes, could have afforded to abide by
Hague Convention standards despite the increased costs, the powers of the
federal government to invade the privacy of the upper classes might have
encouraged them to seek other means of becoming adoptive parents.'75 They
will be able to take comfort in little or no federal involvement that could lead
to invasions of their privacy.'76 Reducing the possibilities of these invasions
will encourage the wealthy to use the Convention adoptions system and,
therefore, they will turn away from second track adoptions. However, without
the resources or the ability to track adopted children after their adoptions are
complete and finalized, the federal government cannot randomly enter into the
private lives of adoptive families. This positive consequence of maintaining
the current intercountry adoption structure will encourage this area of the
population to use Hague Convention adoptions and they will pressure the U.S.
government to uphold its treaty obligations.
While the need for one Central Authority for communication purposes with
other foreign-based centers is a persuasive argument, it is not necessary for a
federal Central Authority to do more than act as a liaison between the states
and these foreign bodies.177 The need for global communication with the
United States does make limited federal involvement attractive. As an
alternative to no federal Central Authority, perhaps the USCA could act only
in this capacity. This would still supply the states with more than enough
power to continue with their traditional duties while giving the federal
government some involvement and taking pressure off the states to deal with
foreign inquiries. This division of power would prevent the need for massive
funding of a federal international adoption system and keep the states in
control, thereby avoiding constitutional challenges of USCA's validity.
173 See Jenista Testimony, supra note 74.
174 id.
175 id.
176 id.
177 Cecere, supra note 7.
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If Congress does not amend the IAA and the federal government retains
power over intercountry adoptions, there is still a chance to revise the
implementing legislation in order to better carry out the objectives of the
Hague Convention while meeting the needs of United States citizens and
respecting federalism. The process of reviewing public comment on the
proposed guidelines for accreditation of adoption service providers is ongoing
with the support of CACI AB and the State Department. 7 This gives the
adoption community an opportunity to suggest changes to the State Depart-
ment which were not incorporated in the ImA.' It is in this forum that
concerned parties will be able to make a change if the powers of intercountry
adoption remain at the federal level.
IV. CONCLUSION
Oscar Wilde once said, "It is always with the best intentions that the worst
work is done."' 0 These wise words apply to the creators of the Hague
Convention and the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000. Their lofty goals and
broadly-worded objectives, hastily codified without specific guidelines or
strong enforcement measures, may yet set the intercountry adoption commu-
nity on a road to nowhere, paved with good intentions. However, they cannot
be faulted for wanting to stamp out baby-selling and streamline the adoption
process in order to work for the best interests of the world's children and the
parents that long to give those children loving families.
In hindsight, the results of their deliberations show that they have failed to
supply the international community with the best tools to carry out each
document's purpose. The Hague Convention, as we have seen, is too
ambiguous regarding enforcement against baby-selling practices.18 ' Likewise,
the IAA further exacerbates the confusion and controversy surrounding the
international adoption process in the United States. The controversy
surrounding the IAA, in a worst case but very possible scenario, could lead to
a Supreme Court declaration of unconstitutionality and U.S. withdrawal from
the Hague Convention. Such a withdrawal could help destroy the aims of the
Hague Convention and plunge the rest of the world into a similar confusion
... Hague Adoption Standards Project, supra note 64.
179 Id.
IS0 Rob Kall, Quotations on Intention, at http://www.futurehealth.org/qintention.htm (last
visited June 26, 2005).
181 Stein, supra note 9, at 76-77.
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regarding intercountry adoption. A world with two tracks of adoption would
certainly veer towards catering to market demand. This which would still exist
despite a virtual collapse of the political institutions created to regulate the
demand for babies. This unhappy ending to a story that began with such
promise can never offer the successful completion of either document's
mission.
In order to prevent these problems, the United States has a variety of
choices. On the international stage, they can directly appeal for amendments
to the Hague Convention to call for more specific and stronger guidelines
against baby-selling. On the domestic level, the federal government can
choose to refrain from Hague Convention ratification. It can also amend the
IAA to reduce federal involvement. However, if federal power over
intercountry adoption continues, it must have more definite regulations. The
chance that constitutional challenges may arise and risk the ability of the
United States to comply with its treaty obligations may still exist under this
system.
Weighing the risks of these alternatives clarifies that the United States is
in a perilous position internationally and domestically if it continues to
implement and abide by the IAA as it presently stands, and remains on track
to ratify the Hague Convention in 2006. The United States must either refrain
from ratifying the Hague Convention and seek its international amendment in
an Extraordinary Session of the Hague Conference on Private International
Law or seek to amend the LAA at home to repair those aspects that will leave
it open to constitutional challenge. If the United States does not make a choice
between these two paths and recognize the responsibility it has as the principal
destination nation in adoption, the eventual failure of the Hague Convention
and disappointment of thousands of prospective adoptive parents and needy
children abroad will rest heavily upon it.
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